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Notes
AImoNy PENDENTE LTE-AccOUNTING
Separate actions were brought by both husband and wife for
separation from bed and board. A judgment was rendered in
favor of the wife for separation from bed and board and alimony
of $175 per month was awarded. The husband paid alimony for
the time he continued to administer the "community" assets both
before and after the separation from bed and board was ren-
dered.' Subsequently, the wife instituted an action for partition
of the community and for, an accounting. Both the husband and
wife appealed to the Supreme Court on issues concerning the
partition of the community by the lower court. It was the wife's
contention that the husband alone was responsible, either from
his share of the community or from his separate means, for the
alimony pendente lite. The husband, on the other hand, sought
to have the alimony deducted from the "community" income from
that period.2 Held, the Supreme Court amended and affirmed
the judgment of the lower court, allowing the husband to deduct
the entire amount of alimony pendente lite paid the wife from
income derived from the "community" assets for the same period.
Uchello v. Uchello, 200 La. 1061, 58 So. 2d 385 (1952).
A proper analysis of the Civil Code provisions concerning
alimony pendente lite would seem to indicate that the conten-
tions of both the husband and wife were incorrect. The alimony,
it is submitted, should properly have been deducted from the
1. There is no provision in our code for alimony after separation. Never-
theless, the Supreme Court has awarded such alimony by first considering
separation as a mere step towards divorce and second by applying Article
148 to the situation. Arnold v. Arnold, 186 La. 323, 172 So. 172 (1937). For a
complete discussion of this and other views, see Lazarus, What Price Ali-
mony, 11 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEw 401 (1951).
Although this property is called community property, if a final judgment
of separation from bed and board or of divorce is rendered, then such prop-
erty is actually not community but separate property for that period.
2. At least this is the impression given by the opinion of the court.
Counsel for the husband in their brief stated: "The sole contention is that
a husband, against whom an alimony allowance has been impressed calcu-
lated on his income from community rentals, should not be made to pay a
second time to his wife one-half of these rentals, which rentals have already
been paid in alimony." Original Brief on Behalf of Anthony Uchello, Defen-
dant and Appellant, Supreme Court of Louisiana, No. 40,063 and 40,260, con-
solidated, p. 16.
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wife's share of income derived from the "community" assets for
that period.
The criterion for alimony pendente lite as set forth by Article
148 of the Louisiana Civil Code is the wife's needs and relative
lack of income.3 Naturally the purpose of such aimony is to
assure the wife of adequate support pending a judgment of sep-
aration from bed and board or divorce. If the parties are sep-
arate in property and the wife manages her own affairs, the solu-
tion is simple. In such a case, the difference between the wife's
income and her needs is supplied by the husband from his sep-
arate means. But difficulty is encountered in a case were a com-
munity property regime exists between the spouses. The diffi-
culty lies in determining the wife's income for that period of
time between the filing of petition and the rendering of a final
judgment. It is impossible to determine her complete income for
this period until judgment has been rendered granting either
separation from bed and board or divorce. If the action is suc-
cessful and a separation from bed and board or divorce is granted,
the wife is entitled to one-half of the "community" assets and
income therefrom for that period; or to phrase this another way,
the community is split retroactively as of the date of the filing
of the petition for separation or divorce.4 But during this period
when the husband administers the "community" assets, the wife
needs support and is hardly in a position to wait until a judgment
of partition has been rendered. Therefore, the court should deter-
mine first the wife's needs and, second, the amount of income
actually available to her. The difference between these two is
the amount that the wife requires in order to support herself.
The court, therefore, should simply order the husband to make
available to her the difference between her needs and the amount
of income actually available to her. If subsequently, however,
the community is split by a final judgment of separation from
bed and board or divorce, then one-half of the income from the
"community" assets for that period belongs by right to the wife.
The fact that such income is made available to her after such
period is over should not relieve her of the obligation of using
this income for her self-support. Thus, when the accounting is
3. "If the wife has not a sufficient income for her maintenance pending
the suit for separation from bed and board or for divorce, the judge shall
allow her, whether she appear as plaintiff or defendant, a sum for her sup-
port, proportioned to her needs and to the means of her husband." Art. 148,
La. Civil Code of 1870.
4. Art. 2432, La. Civil Code of 1870.
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made any income the wife has a right to for that previous period,
by reason of the partitioning of the community, should be applied
to the alimony pendente lite that has been paid her. If this is not
done then the wife is in the enviable position of receiving income
for a period of time, but not being required to use it. Such action
would be in direct contravention to the provisions of Article 148,
because in such case, the wife's support for that period would
be paid for by the husband, even though she herself had some
income. The early jurisprudence of the Supreme Court recog-
nized this. Thus in Hill v. Hill," the court followed just such a
theory. Alimony pendente lite paid to the wife was deducted
from the wife's share of income from the "community" assets for
that period. Subsequent jurisprudence, however, has failed to
follow such reasoning. In White v. White,6 the Supreme Court
deducted the amount of alimony, not from the wife's share, but
from the community income. The reason for this change is not
clear, since the court uses the Hill case as authority for its deci-
sion in the White case. Even though the present case follows the
decision in the White case, the court cites both the White and the
Hill cases as authority, but fails to distinguish between the two.
In determining what has been done in other states concern-
ing this problem, only the old line community property systems
were taken for comparison. 7 The reason for this is obvious.,
Both California and Idaho have very definite statutes con-
cerning the deductions of alimony pendente lite. In California
such alimony is given to either party if he or she is in need of
such support.9 In making the accounting "the court must resort
(1) To the community property; (2) then to the separate prop-
erty of the party required to make such payment."' 0 The Idaho
statute differs only in that the wife alone may receive such ali-
mony.11 Thus the decision in the case under discussion would be
correct under the laws of these jurisdictions.
5. 115 La. 490, 39 So. 503 (1905).
6. 159 La. 1062, 106 So. 567 (1925).
7. "In addition to the eight old-line community-property states (Arizona,
California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico, Texas and Washington),
six jurisdictions, Hawaii, Michigan, Nebraska, Oklahoma, Oregon, and Penn-
sylvania partially adopted the community-property system in 1945 and 1947
in order to secure federal income-tax advantages for their more affluent
citizens." Marsh, Marital Property in Conflict of Laws, 9, n. 1 (1952). See
also McKay, A Treatise on the Law of Community Property (1925).
8. If no community exists and the wife is in need of support, the only
place such aid can be obtained is from the husband.
9. Cal. Code Civ. Proc. Ann., § 1955 (Deering 1946).
10. Id. at § 141.
11. Idaho Code 1947, § 32-708.
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In Washington, Arizona, Nevada and Texas the division of
the community is left to the discretion of the court.1 2 The Texas
statute concerning alimony pendente lite is most similar to ours,
for it is proportioned to the wife's needs and the husband's
means.' 3 But even in that state the results reached may differ
substantially from ours, for Texas spouses may dissolve the com-
munity at will by mutual agreement.' 4
Thus it is seen that the statutes and jurisprudence of other
community property states shed very little light upon the problem
in Louisiana. The major reason for this is the unique stand taken
in Louisiana, as opposed to the other states, that the spouses have
a very definite vested interest in the community assets. Other
states either do not have such a vested interest by the spouses or
such interest is indefinite and may be changed by the court
depending upon the circumstances.' 5 It is believed, therefore,
that the solution to the problem lies wholly in a more compete
analysis of Article 148 and in a re-examination of prior juris-
prudence.
Maynard E. Cush
CONTRACTS-PRE-EXISTING LEGAL DUTY-LOUISIANA LAW
Plaintiff, under a verbal contract of employment, sought to
recover from defendant the value of his services for the demoli-
tion and removal of a "steel reenforced" concrete foundation of
a diesel engine in defendant's plant. The day after work was
begun on the removal of the foundation, the plaintiff informed
the defendant that he could not afford to work any longer under
the original contract, for it had not been contemplated that the
concrete would be "full of iron." Another contract was executed
at that time whereby the plaintiff agreed to carry on the work
until Tuesday morning, meaning the second day after that on
12. However, in some states the court may not only (1) award the hus-
band's entire share of community assets to the wife, but also (2) may order
some of the husband's separate assets to be paid over to her. As to (1)
above, see N.M. Stat. 1941, § 25-716. Cf. Harper v. Harper, 54 N.M. 194,
217 P. 2d 857 (1950). In this case the court called the award of assets "lump-
sum alimony." As to (2) above, see Remington's Wash. Rev. Stat. 1932,
§ 26.08.110. Cf. Hale v. Hale, 76 Wash. 34, 135 Pac. 481 (1931).
13. Vernon's Tex. Stat. 1948, Art. 4637.
14. Id. at Art. 4624a.
15. The rights of both parties depend on the discretion of the court. Thus
the court's only restraint is its own sense of justice. See notes 12 and 13,
supra.
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